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Competition law and the obligation to supply 
In search of an obligation with more misunderstandings than ac-
tual scope and a slow incorporation into Danish law 
By Christian Bergqvist1 
 
While accepted in theory and practice that an obligation to supply, ser-
vice or license can emerge under competition law, the scope of this is 
subject to many, if not lacunas, at least ambiguities, and no general ob-
ligations of such nature can, no should, be identified. Further, and 
equally important, the narrow set of circumstances warranting inter-
vention against refusals is defined by competition law in accordance 
with its underlying principles of a predominantly economic nature. 
Hence, competition law should not be relied upon as a corrective in-
strument to lacunas in other areas of law, e.g. compulsory licenses un-
der IP law. Below, some considerations regarding the obligation to sup-
ply under competition law are offered for the purpose of correcting the 
misunderstandings. 
It is often suggested, but rarely developed further, that competition law 
could (and should) serve as a corrective instrument for regulatory lacunas, 
thereby resting e.g. the obligation to supply or conclude contracts on a com-
petition law bed where the matter has not been resolved in a satisfactory 
manner under sector specific regulation. However, that presumption is for a 
number of reasons manifestly wrong, and a prudent approach to the matter 
would be to clear the misunderstandings from the outset. First and foremost, 
competition law should be viewed as an independent area of law and not a 
supplement to others areas. From a sector specific perspective, it might be 
attractive and convenient to view competition law, with its ex post applica-
tion to a conflict, as a supplement to the ex ante review already conducted 
under sector specific regulation allowing for intervention against conflicts 
that have not been remedied in a satisfactory manner under the latter. How-
ever, that would de facto reduce competition law to an appendix to sector 
regulation rather than a stand-alone regulation and therefore represents a 
manifestly wrong perception of competition law. While competition law, in 
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certain limited situations, very well could supplement sector regulation by 
remedying defaults, it would be done in accordance with competition law 
doctrine and principles with little respect to any considerations enshrined in 
sector regulation. In short, competition law would serve on its own terms 
and with little, if any, regards to sector regulation, and interests advanced 
under this potentially giving a result unattractive from a sector perspective.  
Secondly and partly linked to the first objection, competition law has ma-
tured to an area of law subject to its own requirement, doctrine and consid-
eration requiring a (prudent) balancing of opposing interests that potentially 
could differ significantly from those enshrined in sector specific regulation. 
In the course of the last sixteen years, where competition law in Denmark 
has matured into a fully-fledged legal frame, it has emerged as a system 
linked to the pursuit of economic (long-term) efficiency and the protecting 
of the competition process rather than competition, and competitor, in itself. 
Hence, competition law does not take much interest in the specific consumer 
or competitor victimized by an infringement, but rather the general and 
broad interest of all consumers and competitors. Under competition law, it 
is therefore perfectly legitimate to eliminate competitors, provided that it 
follows from inefficiencies such as higher costs or lower quality and thereby 
limits the associated consumer loss significantly. Perhaps it might even be 
allowed to eliminate an equally efficient competitor if this suffers shortage 
of credit or cash or for other business based reasons, provided that it does 
not lead to the elimination of all competitors or the last of these, tilting the 
market conditions in favour of a monopoly, presumably contradictive to the 
interest of consumers and the market. Further, ex post competition law en-
forcement is rarely called into actual service but rather works behind the 
scenes through credible, and deterrent, remedies that few companies desire 
to encounter. Notably would also be that the actual enforcement is done by a 
general body with very limited sector specific knowledge, or consideration, 
in accordance with a lengthy and prudent process enshrining checks and 
balances to which plaintiff would not be considered party.2 Sector specific 
regulation could in contrast differ on numerous accounts, e.g. by pursuing 
other objectives such as fairness or swiftness and by its enforcement by a 
designated sector regulator incorporating sector knowledge and by hammer-
ing out obligations in details, emphasizing the mitigation of conflict ex ante 
rather than the resolving ex post. Further, acting as a mediator, rather than 
an enforcer, the Agency would normally attempt to strike a fair balance of 
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 3 
opposing interests with a high degree of involvement from the plaintiff and 
the defendant. 
Thirdly, it has been articulated directly in e.g. the Danish Competition Act,3 
and de facto accepted under EU competition law,4 that competition law 
yields where a matter has been regulated by sector specific regulation and 
conflicts are presumably internalized. Hence, competition law could in prin-
ciple not serve as a corrective instrument for regulatory lacunas, even where 
the matter obviously eludes sector regulation or produces an unsatisfactory 
or anti-competitive result.5 While the scope of the obligation and the em-
bedded doctrine are subject to a number of ambiguities, e.g. where no deci-
sion has been rendered by a sector regulator, it is obvious that this doctrine 
limits the ability of competition law to close regulatory gaps or shortages in 
sector regulation. Consequently, competition law should not be relied upon 
as a corrective instrument to general lacunas in other areas of law, e.g. com-
pulsory licenses under IP law, without entirely precluding the possibility. In 
a (narrow) set of circumstances, intervention against a refusal to supply 
might be available under competition law. This will be developed further 
below, followed by a few considerations as to the use of competition law to 
correct lacunas. The later will be offered despite the initial dismissal of the 
ability to do this.  
Competition law and refusal to supply 
Despite the reservation outlined above, a (narrow) obligation to supply 
could be established under competition law in accordance with one of the 
following doctrines: 
1. Refusal to supply could potentially foreclosure the market, subject to 
the requirements that a) the suppler is dominant,6 and b) the product or 
service in question is essential for the long term survival of the parties 
 
3
 Pursuant to Article 2 (2) of the Danish Competition Act, the act and its obligations are not ap-
plicable to restrictions that follow directly from public regulation. 
4
 See Nicolas Petit, Circumscribing the Scope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries? A 
Comparative Approach to the US Supreme Court Ruling in the Trinko Case, Journal of Net-
work Industries, 5: 2004 pp. 347-362. 
5
 An example of this can be seen in Terminal A - Konkurrencerådets beslutning om at rette hen-
vendelse til transportministeren af 25. januar 2012, the Competition Council meeting 12. 
January 2012 where it somewhat late in the process was uncovered that public regulation 
precluded further pursuing of the case under Competition Law. 
6
 The issue of dominance will not be discussed further in this article. However, normally market 
shares in excess of 40% would be required before dominance could be established. For fur-
ther discussions on the issue, see Luis Ortiz Blanco, Market Power in EU antitrust law, Hart 
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requesting supplies. A variation of this doctrine is the disruption of on-
going and current supplies. While in principle subject to the same re-
quirements, the essentiality discussion might be of less importance as an 
abrupt termination could shake most companies. Hence, a legal distinc-
tion between the de nova refusal and disruption of supplies might be 
relevant. Further, the latter would presumable also cover different forms 
of sabotage and constructive refusal to supply. 
2. Discriminatory refusal of supply, where only a limited number of com-
panies are offered terms without a valid course. While in principle sub-
ject to the same requirements as doctrine 1, the discriminatory element 
could in practice taint the appraisal and ease the essentiality discussion. 
3. A collective refusal to supply, where companies agrees to boycott a 
named third party with the intention of foreclosing him. While foreclo-
sure should in principle require that the parties have market power and 
that the product in question could be considered essential, practice indi-
cates that these criteria tend to be treated somewhat superficially. 
As indicated by the doctrines outlined above, competition law does not pro-
vide for a refusal-to-supply-doctrine but rather a prohibition of the monopo-
lization of the market – either unilaterally under section 11 of the Danish 
Competition Act, mirroring Article 102 of the TFEU, or collectively under 
section 6 of the same act, mirroring Article 101 of the TFEU.   
The fall of a doctrine and rise of a set of exceptional circumstances 
Prior to Denmark’s adoption of a modern EU conform competition law in 
1997, a somewhat light handed refusal-to-supply-doctrine had emerged, 
more or less compelling dominant undertakings to supply absent (strong) 
objective reasons. A doctrine applied vigorously against companies result-
ing in an overdeveloped catalogue of objective reasons meriting exceptions 
and few possibilities to elude the obligation outsides these. In contrast, the 
EU Commission had, guided by the European Court of Justice, moved down 
an alternate path. While in principle accepted, c.f. Commercial Solvents7 
(1974), UBC8 (1978), IBM 9 (1984) and Telemarketing10 (1985), that Article 
102 limited the dominant undertaking’s freedom to contract if motivated by 
 
7
 Case C-6 and 7/73 - Commercial Solvents Corporation. ECR 1974 p. 223. 
8
 Case C-27/76 - United Brands Company, ECR 1978, p. 207. 
9
 XIV Report on Competition (1984), recitals 94-95. See also case IV/30.979 and 31.394 - Decca 
Navigator System, O.J. 1989 L43/27. 
10
 Case C-311/84 - Telemarketing (CBEM), ECR 1985, p. 3261. 
Working paper - version of 12 MAR 15 
 
 5 
dubious motives, e.g. an ambition to reserve a secondary market or discour-
age occasional trading with competitors on the main market, the prevailing 
doctrine would gradually shift away in favour of the essential nature of the 
disputed products or services. Further, UBS even opened a (narrow) window 
for the dominant undertaking’s right to protect its own commercial interest, 
e.g. on the main market, when deciding to discontinue, or open, a trading re-
lationship.11 Consequently, what emerged was a doctrine that, despite con-
demning refusals motivated by anticompetitive objectives, would emphasize 
the objective consequences of the refusal rather than its subjective motive. 
Further, the doctrine introduced an important, but not entirely clear, distinc-
tion between vertical and horizontal foreclosures where the first, which 
deals with access to a downstream market, was less likely to be permissible 
compared to the latter,12 which deals with access to the dominated market.  
While the notion of essentiality initially appeared to have played a less pivot 
role,13 this would change. The first set of changes came about through a 
serie of three harbour cases, B&I v. Sealink ,14 Rødby Havn15 and Sea Con-
tainers v. Stena Sealink,16 delivered between 1992 and 1994 and involving a 
cocktail of discretionary terms and plain malicious (ab)use of harbour au-
thority.17 In all of these cases, the Commission referred to the involved har-
bour services as essential facilities that could not be reserved exclusively for 
the benefit of the dominant undertaking or shared under terms less favoura-
ble than those granted to the own services of the dominant undertaking. De-
spite the clear anti-competitive motive and an indefensible behaviour, it was 
allegedly the essential nature of the involved services that merited interven-
tion from the Commission rather than the malicious abuse. This was en-
shrined further with four subsequent cases involving rail operations. HOV 
 
11
 Case 27/76 - UBC, ECR. 1978, p. 207, recital 189. See also case 77/77 - BP, ECR. 1978 p. 
1513, recitals 18 and 32; case IV/32.279 - BBI/Boosey & Hawkes O.J. 1987L 286/36 and Fil-
trona/Tabacalaera - XIX Report on Competition Policy (1989), recital 61. 
12
 For further, see Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 
102, Second Edition, Hart Publishing 2013, pp. 541-542. 
13
 See e.g. cases C-6 and 7/73 - Commercial Solvents Corporation. ECR 1974 p. 223, recital 15 
and 26 where the relevance of existing alternative suppliers largely was ignored. 
14
 Case B&I v. Sealink , 1992, XXII Report on Competition (1992), recital 219. 
15
 Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facili-
ties of the port of Rødby, O.J. 1994L 55/52, recital 12. 
16
 Case IV/34.689 - Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink , O.J. 1994L 15/8, recital 66. 
17
 B&I v. Sealink offers a primar facia example of this as Sealink, which also served in the capaci-
ty of port authority, had timed its own ferry sailing times in a way that would cause maxi-
mum damage to B&I operations. Due to the port's limitations when a Sealink vessel passes a 
moored B&I ship, the water in the harbour would rise, making it required to disconnect load-
ing and unloading operations.  
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SVZ/MCN,18 ACI,19 European Night Services20 and Eurotunnel,21 all decid-
ed by the Commission in a narrow span between March and December 
1994,22 and implying an obligation to offer non-discriminatory access to es-
sential infrastructure facilities.  
Jointly these cases would give ground for a European version of the Essen-
tial Facility Doctrine, compelling dominant undertakings to offer shared use 
of certain non-replicable (infrastructure) facilities and hence conclude, and 
maintain, supply agreements absent (legitimate) cause. Consequently, it was 
not without merits when the Commission in its Access Notice23 from August 
1998 could summarize that an obligation to offer access to an unreplicable 
facility could emerge if: 
a) access to the requested facility was essential in order for companies to 
compete on a related market, 
b) there was sufficient capacity available to provide access and no objective 
justification for refusing it,  
c) the company tabling the request was willing to pay a reasonable and 
non-discriminatory price and to accept other fair terms and conditions, 
d) the facility owner fails in meeting demand on an existing service or 
product market, blocks the emergence of new services or products or 
otherwise impedes competition on an existing or potential market. 
Further, as demonstrated by early cases as IBM and Telemarketing, it did 
not matter whether the requested product was a service, facility or product. 
All could become subject to an obligation to offer terms. Neither did the ab-
sence of special rights, public funding or authority matter, rendering Article 
 
18
 Case 33.941 - HOV SVZ/MCN, O.J. 1994L 104, p. 34. Upheld by T-229/94 - Deutsche Bahn. 
19
 Case IV/34.518 - ACI, O.J. 1994L 224 p. 28. 
20
 Case IV/34.600 - Night Services O.J. 1994L 259, p. 20. The case did not relate to Article 102 
but the appraising of a joint venture under Article 101 (3) and was further overturned by the 
General Court. The prevailing principle does, however, offer guidance on Article 102. 
21
 Case 32.490 – Eurotunnel, O.J. 1994L 354 p. 66. 
22
 European Night Services and Eurotunnel where both overturned by the General Court. How-
ever, their original form illustrates the Commission’s initial perception of a refusal to supply 
doctrine in the mid 1990s. 
23
 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunica-
tions sector - framework, relevant markets and principles. O.J. 1998C 265, pp. 2–28, recital 
91. However, it should be noted that the notice does not cite UBS in respect to the right to 
protect self-interest as indicated. It is not clear why. Either the Commission does not accept 
the right or it has limited itself to outline the general principles. 
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106 admissible,24 as demonstrated by Commercial Solvents, UBC and IBM. 
All cases where refusals initiated by privately operated and funded compa-
nies merited condemnation. Not even IP right was sacred as demonstrated 
by Magil,25 finally closed in 1995, and involving the somewhat dubious re-
taining of the weekly schedules of television channels requested for the pur-
pose of consolidating them into a single TV guide covering all channels. A 
product for which there was a clear consumer demand in the absence of a 
comparable service. However, while upholding the Commission’s assess-
ments, even expanding the doctrine to cover IP rights, there was neverthe-
less a double-edged element to Magil as it also would sow the seeds of a 
gradual reframing of the doctrines. Rather than utilizing the wording of pre-
vious cases, e.g. by labelling IP rights as essential if license was a precondi-
tion for effective market entry, the Court of Justice reserved intervention for 
exceptional circumstances, thereby giving rise to a slightly alternative doc-
trine. Further, the court noted that absent license, the development of a new 
product for which there was a clear consumer demand had been suppressed. 
An initially unnoticed remark that later would come back and haunt the 
Commission with vengeance. 
Reframing the doctrine and tightening the requirements 
While Magil had identified an obligation to license subject to the require-
ment of exceptional circumstances, the scope of this concept remained 
somewhat foggy until Night Service26 and Bronner27 delivered September 
and November 1998. While the first provided an overturn of the Commis-
sion’s negative appraisal of a joint venture established to offer services 
through the Channel Tunnel in the absence of two vertically linked markets 
and a potential foreclosure of one of these, the later specifically dealt with 
what to consider exceptional circumstances. A request tabled by an Austrian 
court dealing with a national refusal to supply case and therefore in need for 
 
24
 Article 106 (1) of the TFEU deals with undertakings granted special or exclusive rights by 
public act or other public instrument, and is in conjunction with Article 102 generally per-
ceived to tighten the appraisal of potential anti-competitive behaviour compared to a pure Ar-
ticle 102 case. For further on Article 106 (1) and abusive behavior, see e.g. Richard Whish 
and David Bailey, Competition law, 7
th
 edition, Oxford 2012, pp. 229-235. 
25
 Case C-241/91P and 242/91P - Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Pub-
lications Ltd (ITP) v. the Commission, ECR. 1995, p. I. 743. See in particular recitals 49-56. 
Reviewing the case, it appears that the Commission had some reservation in accepting the 
requested information as IP rights, and it cannot be excluded that this has materially influ-
enced the case. 
26
 United cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 - European Night Services Ltd 
(ENS) and others, ECR. 1998 p. II-3141. See in particular recitals 185-187 and 208-209. 
27
 Case C-7/97 - Oscar Bronner, ECR. 1998 p. I-7791. See in particular recitals 40-46. 
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guidance. Both cases are notable and have contributed significantly to our 
understanding of the concept of abuse. Assuming that the Commission pur-
sued Night Service against the notion of the Channel Tunnel as an essential 
facility under the essential facility doctrine, it is difficult not to see the Gen-
eral Court decision as a blow against both. Further, in Bronner, the Court of 
Justice replied that an abuse would require two vertically linked markets 
where the requested product could be considered indispensable for the abil-
ity to access the second in the absence of realistic alternative, making a 
foreclosure from this plausible. The national court should therefore check 
for alternatives, even if these might be less attractive or unavailable for lack 
of economies of scale. An approach casted in iron when the Court of Justice 
also used the opportunity to revisit Commercial Solvents retroactively, in-
terpreting a foreclosure risk in this despite the original wording of the rul-
ing, largely ignoring the issue.28 
While it might represent a mis- or overinterpretation to extract too much 
from Night Service, it would take a deaf to ignore the message sent from 
Bronner. The requirement of exceptional circumstances should be taken se-
riously. A requirement explained beautifully by the General Advocate, but 
regrettably not cited in the ruling29 when he noted that “In the long term it is 
generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a com-
pany to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for the pur-
pose of its business. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or 
distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for 
a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus while competition was 
increased in the short term it would be reduced in the long term. Moreover, 
the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities 
would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the 
benefits. Thus the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a 
dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify 
requiring access to it”. 
Trough Magil, Night Service and Bronner, a doctrine has emerged, reserv-
ing intervention to exceptional circumstances essentially defined as the 
presence of two vertically linked markets and a foreclosure risk on the later 
absent delivery, service or license on the first.30 Further, by revisiting Com-
mercial Solvents, the Court appeared to have aligned refusal to service new 
 
28
 Case C-7/97 - Oscar Bronner, ECR. 1998 p. I-7791, recital 38. 
29
 See recital 57 of the General Advocate opinion. 
30
 Elements can also be extracted from case T-504/93 - Tiercé Ladbroke, ECR. 1997 p. II 923, 
decided parallel to these cases. 
Working paper - version of 12 MAR 15 
 
 9 
customers with termination of existing, making distinctions redundant. A 
doctrine that at the same time could be considered both wider and narrower 
compared to the initially tabled Essential Facility Doctrine. Wider in its re-
quirement of access to a market rather than merely the naked infrastructure 
facility, thereby implying that delivery could include less essential facilities 
and products if a precondition for effective access.31 Narrower when requir-
ing two separate products and markets, vertically linked, where one could 
be labelled essential for the second, thereby excluding vertically integrated 
products with no (or little) demand for the unbundled products.  
The notion of a new product and the ghost of past Christmas 
While it might be possible to view, in particular, Bronner as an attempt by 
the Courts to align the different doctrines into a single, relatively easily ap-
plicable (and narrow), doctrine, this was shattered with the judgment in 
IMS32 in 2004. Further, this was done in a situation where the General Court 
already had declined to accept interim relief overturning the Commission 
decision on the matter.33 Here the Court of Justice once again was called to 
clarify when to label a refusal to license as abusive under Article 102. Echo-
ing the principles offered in Bronner, the Court of Justice reserved interven-
tion for exceptional circumstances, requiring two separate products and a 
potential foreclosure in the absence of alternatives, including less attractive 
alternatives. However, then the Court decided to add something new. First-
ly, and perhaps neither unexpected nor controversial, by noting that it was 
not required that products or services currently were marketed independent-
ly if a potential demand, and hence a market, for these existed. It was there-
fore sufficient that a hypothetical market could be identified. Secondly, and 
of much more far-reaching consequence, the Court then noted how the re-
fusal could suppress the tabling of new products or services for which there 
was consumer demand. A consideration initially offered in Magil but subse-
quently largely ignored. As both cases, in contrast to Bronner, had dealt 
with the refusal to license IP rights and both, also in contrast to Bronner, 
had articulated the suppression of new products requested by the consumers, 
it would be difficult not to conclude that two separate doctrines had pre-
vailed. One for dealing with the refusal to supply of non-IP rights requiring 
two products and a likely foreclosure, and a more rigid reserved for IP rights 
 
31
 For a critical assessment of this, see e.g. Nicolas Petit, Circumscribing the Scope of EC Com-
petition Law in Network Industries? A Comparative Approach to the US Supreme Court Rul-
ing in Trinko, Journal of Network Industries, 5: 2004 pp. 347-362. 
32
 Case C-418/01 - IMS Health, ECR. 2004, p. I-5039. See in particular recitals 29, 37-45 and 49.  
33
 Case T-184/01R - IMS Health v. Commission.  See in particular recitals 96, 100 and 101-102. 
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also requiring a new product subject to consumer demands. A doctrine that 
in theory should preclude situations of downstream competition, and hence 
would stand out as significantly more attractive from the perspective of the 
dominant undertaking. Further, in its decision overturning the Commis-
sion’s initial granting of interim relief, the General Court had specifically 
noted that unlike Magil no new products were offered in the case, indicating 
that all the parties were acutely aware of the issue when IMS was delivered 
by the Court of Justice. 
The problem and potential damage were, however, much more grievous 
than merely the emerging of a new and more rigid doctrine. A not to unfa-
miliar event under competition law in light of its high dependency on actual 
cases and doctrines extracted from these. At the time of deciding IMS, the 
Commission had been in the process of finalizing what would become Mi-
crosoft I. Anticipating,34 if not the outcome of IMS, at least its potential 
damage, the Commission accelerated the delivery of its Microsoft decision, 
tabling it a month prior to IMS. A prudent move as the case also involved 
the non-license of IP rights but no new products.35 Under a rigid and formal 
application of IMS and the “new product requirement”, no abusive refusal 
could therefore be identified. A not particular attractive outcome taking the 
considerable time and resources invested by the Commission into considera-
tions.36 Reviewing the case, the General Court sided with the Commission 
and concluded in Microsoft I,37 from 2007, that the issue of a new product 
articulated by the Court of Justice in Magil and IMS, and accepted by itself 
in the latter, was not a legal requirement but merely an example of how con-
sumers could suffer from lack of licensing. Hence, once again the doctrines 
had been aligned, forming a single coherent doctrine requiring two products 
and markets and a potential foreclosure of one of these in the absence of vi-
able alternatives. Further, some flexibility of the latter could reasonably be 
extracted from the case as the (illegal) refusals at the time of the ruling had 
spanned almost a decade. A plaintiff would therefore not be required to 
 
34
 It remains open whether the Commission had a prior warning of the outcome of IMS and its 
potential articulating of a new product requirement. However, in light of the unsuccessful at-
tempt to secure interim relief and the General Court decline in the absence of a new product, 
it would be fair to contemplate this. 
35
 Just like Magil, it appears that the Commission was somewhat unwilling in accepting the dis-
puted information as IP rights. It was, however, eventually accepted. 
36
 The lineage of the case can be traced back to a complaint logged in 1998. However, the Com-
mission’s interactions with Microsoft began much earlier. See e.g. XXIV Report of Competi-
tion Policy (1994) p. 364. 
37
 Case T-201/04 - Microsoft Corp. ECR 2007, p. II-3601. See in particular recital 643. 
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demonstrate actual foreclosure, but merely that this would eventually be 
plausible, which significantly lifted the plaintiff’s burden of proof. 
Post Microsoft I and a reopening of the discussions on multiple doctrines 
With Microsoft I it had been settled that IP rights were not subject to a sepa-
rate and more rigid doctrine. Further, with Clearstream38 from 2004 it was 
even indicated that discriminatory refusals were, in principle, subject to the 
same fundamental requirement of exceptional circumstances and of a pro-
duct or service indispensable for the ability to enter, or remain, viable on a 
linked market. When adopting the Enforcement Paper39 in 2008, the Com-
mission could therefore summarize that a refusal could be considered abu-
sive if “a) the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively ne-
cessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market”, b) “the 
refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market, and” c) “the refusal is likely to lead to consumer 
harm." In contrast had potential sub-doctrines been suggested in the previ-
ous Discussion Paper40 from 2005, e.g. in respect to technical information 
required to ensure interoperability. Here, such information could rarely be 
retained for the sole use of the proprietor. A not particular elaborate attempt 
to provide cover for the Commission’s position in Microsoft I. 
Regrettably would this position of relative tranquillity and balance in the 
force not be maintained very long as the next set of cases and rulings were 
mustering at the gate. Despite reserving the right to review disruption of 
supplies separately to a de nova refusal in the Enforcement Paper,41 there 
were few indications that this should be taken literally beyond the obvious. 
That an unexpected and erupt termination could shake most companies, in 
particular if they have undertaken what the Commission referred to as “rela-
tionship-specific investments” and hence become dependent on continuous 
supplies. However, in Sot Lélos42 from 2008, the Court of Justice decided to 
cite Commercial Solvents rather than Bronner when called to clear when to 
 
38
 COMP/38.096 - PO/Clearstream (Clearing and settlement). See recital 227, where Bronner 
and its criteria are applied to a discriminatory refusal to supply. 
39
 Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, recital 81. 
40
 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusion-
ary abuse, recital XX. See also recital 218, where disruption of current supplies are identified 
as a (potential) separate set of abusive behaviour. 
41
 Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, recital 84. 
42
 Case C-468/06 - 478/06 - Sot Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline, ECR 2008, p. I-7139. 
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consider a reduction in supplies abusive.43 The case related to the re-export 
of pharmaceutical products and the decline to supply products beyond what 
was realistically required for domestic use and should be evaluated in the 
light of this. While some authors simply ignore the ruling, others attribute it 
to a separate category of abusive behaviour harmful to the single market44 
and hence, limit its implications for the general refusal to supply doctrine. 
While much sympathy could be offered in respect to the latter position, it 
would not be prudent to neglect the issue entirely. In particular as the Com-
mission have occasionally revealed itself as a subscriber to the idea of sepa-
rate doctrines. Most clearly in the Discussion Paper,45 serving as a draft for 
the Enforcement Paper, but also visible in the later. Even more turbulence 
has emerged in the wake of Microsoft I as rumours started to leak shortly af-
ter its decision, including that it was decided by a narrow majority of judg-
es,46 indicating how divided the court was in 2007. Consequently, much ef-
fort has been made to extract clues from Microsoft II47 from 2012. A case 
not dealing indirectly with refusals to supply, but merely with the magni-
tude of the fine to be levied upon Microsoft for failing to stop its illegal re-
fusals as ordered by the Commissions in 2004. As a warm up to its legal ra-
tioning, the General Court opened Microsoft II by citing IMS and the new 
product requirement, noting that these where meet in Microsoft I. Labelling 
this as incorrect would, as detailed earlier, be a mild understatement, indi-
cating that either the General Court expressed itself somewhat untimely or 
decided to use the opportunity to reopen the discussions. Regardless of the 
options, little can be said to have been settled beyond the requirement of 
two markets and some kind of foreclosure risk. 
Refusal to supply in Danish law - A somewhat slow incorporation 
As indicated initially, a somewhat light handed doctrine on refusal to supply 
had developed under Danish competition law. Partly due to the lack of 
alignment with EU law. A lacuna that would be remedied in 1997 with the 
adoption of an EU conform Competition Act, incorporating provisions mir-
roring Article 101 and 102. Further, the governing EU principles were arti-
culated into the preparatory work, identifying an abusive refusal if a domi-
 
43
 Revisiting case COMP/38.096 - PO/Clearstream (Clearing and settlement), recitals 242-243, 
the same consideration can be identified here. 
44
 See e.g. Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition law, 7
th
 edition, Oxford 2012, p. 711. 
45
 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusion-
ary abuse, recital 218. 
46
 See Stephanie Bodoni and Matthew Newman, Microsoft Settled EU Case Not Knowing Vote 
Was 7 to 6, Blomberg, 5 September 2008. 
47
 Case T-167/08 - Microsoft v. Commission. See recitals 139-140. 
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nant undertaking, without objective reasons, denied access to supplies con-
sidered material.48 It is not entirely clear why the word material, in Danish 
væsentlig, was chosen over essential when it must have been clear in 1997 
that EU had moved on in favour of a restrictive doctrine abandoning early 
practice as Commercial Solvents. More important, the decision appears to 
have had an impact as a number of decisions delivered around the end of the 
millennium today would stand out as manifestly wrong. Examples of these 
are Montana Møbler49 from 1998 and Jydsk Camping50 from 2000. In the 
first, the Danish Competition Authority had in support of the obligation to 
supply certain design furniture offered that these where material for the per-
ception of being a serious dealer of exclusive furniture. In the latter, it was 
held that the consumer preference for the disputed products was so strong in 
Denmark that it could be considered essential to include them in the selec-
tion. In a modern perspective, neither of these would pass the essentiality 
test formulated with Bronner, indicating a problematic (early) alignment to 
EU’s principle51 and room for improvement. 
EU conformity would gradually be secured  
Despite the somewhat less successful translation of Article 102 into Danish 
law, alignment would gradually be secured, and Jydsk Camping would in 
reality be the last case identifying a clear obligation to supply.52 Further, 
with Dansk Taxi Forbund53 from 2001, references are for the first time 
made to Bronner. However, only by the parties before the appeal board and 
in vain as the underlying decision identifying an obligation to supply was 
upheld. However, with Spilleautomatbokse54 from 2003, Bronner is incor-
porated fully, rendering the request for supplies dismissible in the presence 
of alternatives. It is even more clearly articulated in Canal Digital og TV 
 
48
 Folketingstidende 1996-97, Tillæg A, Bind IV, p. 3669. 
49
 Leveringsnægtelse - Montana Møbler A/S /P. Lindegaard Poulsen ApS, Competition Council 
meeting, 27 May 1998. See also Leveringsnægtelse fra B&O overfor Merlin, Competition 
Council meeting 25 November 1998 for the same liberal approach. 
50
 Jydsk Camping Industri A/S meddelt påbud om levering af selskabets fortelte, Competition 
Council meeting 31 Maj 2000. 
51
 It should also be noted that it appears equally unlikely, in a modern perspective, that a domi-
nant position should be identified in the first place, indicating another area where early Dan-
ish practice failed. 
52
 The statement is subject to some reservation as an obligation was indicated, but never finalized 
in a few subsequent cases. Further, as detailed below, a few cases dealing with collective re-
fusals to supply have been assessed under the Danish equivalent of Article 101.  
53
 Dansk Taxi Forbund Centralforeningen af Taxiforeninger m.fl. mod Konkurrencerådet, deci-
sion by the Competition Appeal Board dated 16 January 2001. 
54
 Klage over nægtelse af adgang til modaliteter til formidling af oplysninger fra spilleautomater 
til Spillemyndigheden, Competition Council meeting 18 June 2003. 
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Zulu55 from 2004, requiring exceptional circumstances in order to make a 
request for supplies admissible. 
While reference to Bronner only appears with some time lag, IMS should 
quickly be incorporated, leading to a division of doctrines.56 Not always 
successfully. In the absence of a new product, no obligation to license could 
e.g. be identified in SAP57 from 2004, leading to a dismissal of the logged 
complaint. Most likely a correct conclusion that, however, seems to disre-
gard the Commission’s approach to Microsoft available at the time of SAP, 
making the offered ration somewhat inadequate. Other problematic Danish 
cases are Sækko58 from 2002 and Bekæmpelse af minksygdomme from 
2006.59 Neither of them identifies any obligation to supply, and while the 
conclusions appear solid, the same can regrettably not be said in respect to 
the offered legal analysis and rationing supporting these. In the first, no 
abuse is held on the ground of a combination of objective reasons and lack 
of essentiality rather than a formal application of the Bronner criteria, while 
the latter is closed without any reference to these at all. Perhaps even more 
troublesome is the manner in which the Bronner criteria are applied in Sæk-
ko. Rather than consider the ability to remain viable absent delivery, thereby 
qualifying the essentiality of the requested product objectively, the Compe-
tition Council confines itself to note that it would only amount to a very 
small percentage of plaintiffs’ turnover. This indicates a much more subjec-
tive interoperation of Bronner than outlined above, with the form of a de 
minimis analysis rather than focusing on exceptional circumstances and 
likely consumer harm. 
As none of the cases, post Jydsk Camping, identifies an abusive refusal, 
general principles should perhaps only be extracted with cautiousness. On 
the other hand, they do indicate room from improvements before a clear, 
and EU conform, doctrine could be said to have been developed under Dan-
ish practice. More recent practice, however, appears to have closed the gap, 
securing full alignment. In Terminal A60 from 2012, a case dealing with the 
lease of land for the purpose of constructing a new and competing passenger 
 
55
 Distributionsaftale mellem Canal Digital A/S og TV2 Zulu A/S, Council meeting 28 April 
2004. See in particular recital 66. 
56
 See e.g. Konkurrenceredegørelsen 2006, pp. 290-291. 
57
 Klager over SAP Danmark A/S, Council meeting, 24 November 2004. 
58
 Sække A/S har ikke overtrådt forbuddet mod misbrug af dominerende stilling, Council meeting 
27 November 2002. 
59
 Konkurrencerådet vinder sag om bekæmpelse af minksygdomme, decision by the Competition 
Appeal Board dated 4 December 2006. 
60
 Terminal A - Konkurrencerådets beslutning om at rette henvendelse til transportministeren af 
25. januar 2012, Council meeting 12 January 2012. See recitals 1106 and 1116-1256. 
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terminal in Copenhagen Airport, Bronner is applied correctly. That involves 
reciting the criteria established by Bronner and confirmed with IMS and Mi-
crosoft I, requiring two linked markets and a foreclosure risk followed by 
discussions on the risk of the latter in the absence of alternatives to the land 
and ground controlled by the airport. In this process, the two separate prod-
uct markets are the provision of a) access to runway facilities and the related 
infrastructure and b) terminal and ancillary commercial services to passen-
gers and airline companies followed by substantial analysis supporting that 
only Copenhagen Airport, through the leasing of land, could secure access 
to the latter.61 Intervention under Article 102 and section 11 of the corre-
sponding Danish act was therefore warranted, and had it not been for the 
somewhat late uncovering of regulation preventing the intended unbundling 
of services, an obligation to supply would most likely had been established. 
Objective justification in Danish practice 
Taken the somewhat light handed refusal to supply doctrine that initially 
had been developed in Danish practice, it should not be a surprise that sub-
stantial intellectual efforts had been invested into developing a lengthy cata-
logue of objective justifications warranting exception from the obligation. In 
addition to the obvious ones, e.g. (substantial) technical challenges or lack 
of money and qualifications under a selective distribution system, this in-
cludes past (and repeated) infringements of the proprietor IP rights,62 failure 
to respect contractual obligations63 and lack of economies of scales when 
supplying small orders.64 Further, and most interesting, it had been accepted 
in (old) Danish practice that an obligation to service a direct competitor 
rarely should emerge.65 A position presumable echoing the conclusions fol-
 
61
 The case suffers from a potential flaw by postulating that a separate market for the construc-
tion and operating of airport terminals separately from the remaining airport activities can be 
identified. In support of this, a few, but not particular clear, examples of airports separating 
the terminal activities are provided in recitals 361-378. Should the presumption prove wrong, 
the case would lapse in the same manner as Night Service, making an overturn in an appeal 
plausible. Further, the market subject to an access request is in reality the market for the ope-
ration of airport services rather than a secondary market placed downstream. This would rep-
resent another novel interpretation of EU practice as indicated above by involving horizontal 
foreclosure rather than vertical. As the case never was finalized, both issues remain dormant. 
62
 See e.g. Stokke Danmark ApS v. Konkurrencerådet, decision by the Competition Appeal 
Board dated 5 December 1997. 
63
 Toyota v. Konkurrencerådet, decision by the Competition Appeal Board dated 16 March 
2006. 
64
 See e.g. Dansk Reklamefilms A/S’ standardaftaler, Council meeting 22 June 2006 accepting a 
minimum purchase obligation despite exclusion of certain (minor) customers.  
65
 Sportsdykkerforbundets blad v.Konkurrencestyrelsen, decision by the Competition Appeal 
Board dated 29 September 1998. 
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lowing early EU cases as UBS, but which on the other hand fails to notice 
the dislike demonstrated by the Commission subsequently.66 No comments 
are e.g. offered on the matter in any of the submissions summarizing the le-
gal obligation. Neither the Access Notice, the Discussion Paper nor the En-
forcement Paper gives any indication of such a doctrine. The only indica-
tion in this direction is made in the Access Notice, dealing with the tele-
communication sector and the need here to secure a balance between shared 
access to existing (and old) infrastructure and the investments in new. Here, 
the Commission notes that67 in addition to “… overriding difficulty of 
providing access to the requesting company” it might also be required to 
take “the need for a facility owner which has undertaken investment aimed 
at the introduction of a new product or service” into consideration in order 
to secure him “sufficient time and opportunity to use the facility in order to 
place that new product or service on the market. ” While no general exemp-
tion should be offered for competition reason, it might be relevant to accept 
regulatory holidays and some immunity for new investments.68 The already 
cited Jydsk Camping offers another interesting example of exemptions (not) 
available in Danish practice by indicating that capacity restraints would not 
be a lasting excuse. If required, supplies could be rationed securing all equal 
access to the secondary market. Presuming full alignment with the rigid 
conditioning outlined by Bronner has been secured in Danish practice, it 
would be equally plausible to presume that most of the Danish exceptions 
have become redundant unless reflected in EU practice. 
When all roads lead to Golgata – Other available doctrines 
As indicated initially, other doctrines opening for an obligation to supply 
could be available. Following Telefónica69 from 2007 and Telekomunikacja 
 
66
 Decoding the details of Terminal A, it might be possible to view the case as dealing with hori-
zontal foreclosure, thereby indicating an overturn of the old Danish practice. The case was 
regrettably newer finalized. Further, the case makes no reference to the old practice and the 
difference between vertical and horizontal foreclosure, making it difficult to extract any con-
clusive on the matter. 
67
 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunica-
tions sector - framework, relevant markets and principles. O.J. 1998C 265, pp. 2–28, recital 
91e. 
68
 On the other hand, the Commission has in practice respected that only vertical foreclosure 
should be pursued under Article 102, refrained for condemning undertakings refusing access 
to the “core” market in particular as this would de facto amount to a ban on being dominant. 
69
 COMP/38.784 - Telefónica, recital 302-309. Confirmed by case T-336/07 – Telefónica, SA 
and Telefónica de España, SAU, recital 180 og C-295/12P - Telefónica, SA and Telefónica de 
España, SAU v. Commission, recital 95-99. 
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Polska 70 from 2011 it might be possible to view constructive refusals to 
supply, e.g. the use of unreasonable prices and delayed opening of access 
negotiations, as separate form of abuse. Abuses subject to a less restrictive 
standard as the Commission explicitly refused to apply Bronner to the be-
havior under review. Further, in the Commission’s Access Notice71 from 
August 1998, a distinction is made between refusals when access has al-
ready been granted to another customer and situations where this is not the 
case. The first situation is then labelled discriminatory followed by “…In 
general terms, the dominant company's duty is to provide access in such a 
way that the goods and services offered to downstream companies are 
available on terms no less favourable than those given to other parties, in-
cluding its own corresponding downstream operations.”72 Danish practice 
has picked up on this. In Rørforeningens vvs-nummersystem og vvs-
katalog73 from 2005, the use of minimum turnover requirements for admis-
sion to a catalogue is condemned as discriminatory, most likely in the ab-
sence of a reasonable explanation for the policy but without any analysis of 
the ability, or lack of this, to thwart competition. On the other hand, in 
Dansk Reklamefilms A/S’ standardaftaler,74 from 2006, the use of minimum 
purchase obligations was not condemned despites its potential foreclosure 
of minor customers. Further, following Clearstream,75 from 2004, it appears 
that discriminatory refusals in EU practice are made subject to the same re-
quirement of exceptional circumstances and a product, or service, indispen-
sable for the ability to enter, or remain, viable on a linked market. That 
would make analysis of the issue a precondition for condemnation under 
Article 102. Consequently, the cited Danish practice might have become ob-
solete. But until clearly articulated in a case, the issue would remain some-
what unsettled.  
Alternative doctrines supporting an obligation to supply might be available 
under Article 101 and the corresponding section 6 of the Danish Competi-
 
70
 COMP/39.525 - Telekomunikacja Polska. recital 704 and 803-807, referring to case 52/09 - 
Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera AB, ECR 2011 page I-527, recital 55. 
71
 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunica-
tions sector - framework, relevant markets and principles. O.J. 1998C 265, pp. 2–28, recitals 
84-86. 
72
 For completeness, it should be noted that in recital 85, the Commission notes that discrimina-
tory abuse still requires a restriction of competition. The notion of the latter is, however, not 
developed further. 
73
 Kriterier for optagelse i Rørforeningens vvs-nummersystem og vvs-katalog, Competition 
Council meeting 27 April 2005. 
74
 Dansk Reklamefilms A/S’ standardaftaler, Council meeting 22 June 2006. 
75
 COMP/38.096 - PO/Clearstream (Clearing and settlement). See recital 227, where Bronner 
and its criteria are applied to a discriminatory refusal to supply. 
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tion Act. E.g. if a collective refusal to supply or license is adopted by a 
group of undertakings with the purpose of precluding, or hampering, a 
named third party. A recent Danish case could offer some light on this. In 
Konkurrencebegrænsende samordning i ejendomsmæglerbranchen,76 from 
2012, a group of real-estate agents, including their trade association, repre-
senting 65% of the market, had adopted a policy of not providing pictures of 
real-estates offered for sale to an internet-based portal. The latter was com-
peting with the agents’ own portal, and as the pictures where covered by IP 
rights, it was possible to enforce the agreement effectively. In its decision 
upholding the condemnation, the Appeal Board noted that the agreement 
was neither accessory to the agents’ own portal nor required to protect the 
IP rights. Further, as the agents represented a significant portion of the mar-
ket, the policy would unavoidably put the competing portal at a disadvanta-
geous position without concluding that this would lead to a foreclosure. Fi-
nally, it was noted that the agreement formed part of a wider policy of fore-
closing the competition portal and was not an isolated instrument. Despite 
the cocktail of elements supporting the conclusion, the 65% market share 
should be singled out as the most eminent of these by mirroring the discus-
sions on exceptional circumstances and foreclosure risk from Article 102. 
Despite being a different doctrine, subject to different legal requirements, it 
appears that collective refusals under Article 101 and section 6 follow some 
of the principles identified in respect to Article 102. 
Competition law and regulatory lacunas 
As detailed above, competition law would rarely identify an obligation to 
supply, limiting this to exceptional circumstances, largely defined as an un-
fair attempt to reserve a secondary marked. Further, as Article 102 and the 
Danish section 11 separate dominant and abuse, the mere position of essen-
tial inputs is insufficient to constitute an abuse. Refusal to contract is there-
fore never an abuse in itself, and no general obligation could emerge to 
make a market more competitive and most likely neither to accept entry into 
the market for the essential input. That does not preclude the use of compe-
tition law to correct regulatory lacunas. Under EU law, it has been accepted 
that competition law could serve to enforce obligations imposed under sec-
tor regulation even when the national regulator had already condemned the 
conduct.77 However, this would most likely not be possible under Danish 
 
76
 Konkurrencebegrænsende samordning i ejendomsmæglerbranchen, Competition Council 
meeting 25 January 2012. Upheld by Dansk Ejendomsmæglerforening m.fl. mod Konkurren-
cerådet, decision by the Competition Appeal Board dated 16 November 2012. 
77
 See e.g. COMP/39.525 - Telekomunikacja Polska. recitals 803-807. 
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law as the Danish competition law does not apply to areas subject to specif-
ic regulation. Presuming that no sector regulation is directly applicable to a 
refusal to supply, competition law could be used to establish this as detailed 
above. Further, even contractual obligation could be enforced through com-
petition law parallel to other remedies, provided that the behaviour could be 
considered abusive. That means that an unfair termination of contract or re-
quest for injunctions could be regulated within a very narrow set of circum-
stances. 
